Wittgenstein’s philosophical method: a paper for students

Robert Shaw
The Open Polytechnic of New Zealand

Abstract

This paper seeks to identify and critique Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. It takes the perspective of a student who wants to learn from a pivotal figure in philosophy but finds controversy over what Wittgenstein meant, and even over whether or not he prescribed a method. It is necessary to set out what we mean by “method in philosophy” before we can categorize the character any particular method, and before we can assess the merits of any particular method. Wittgenstein provided his students with clear guidance on the methods of philosophy. He also demonstrated his methods. Those who have suggested otherwise are mistaken possibly because his ideas have been subsumed into analytic philosophy, and because they have not focussed on Wittgenstein’s request that we learn new skills.

Introduction

Wittgenstein is one of the most important philosophers who ever lived and he is credited with starting the analytic school of philosophy. Analytic philosophy “began its life if the interactions between Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein” (Sluga & Stern, 1996, p.7).

Fifty years after his death, there is debate on how we are to understand Wittgenstein. “Wittgenstein's prose style is not always the epitome of clarity…his richly metaphoric style has over the years given rise to a veritable cottage industry of textual interpretation (Givón, 1989, p.44). “Wittgenstein is a difficult philosopher and his writings are not straightforward or easy to understand” (Peters & Marshall, 1999, p.xv). Discussing why understanding Wittgenstein is a challenge, Stern says that this in part “is because Wittgenstein’s writing asks for a change in sensibility that many of his readers are unwilling or unable to accept” (Stern, 1996, p.442).There are recent claims are made that his work has been misunderstood (for example his views on religion, see Richter, 2001). Most of Wittgenstein’s writings are still not available to us although they are progressively being brought into the public arena (The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 2002); and we are told by those who are making them available to be cautious when we read Wittgenstein (Pichler, 2002b). The spectacular part of this is that Wittgenstein knew he would be misunderstood and says at the start of his book that he will be “variously misunderstood, more or less mangled and watered-down” (Wittgenstein, 1968, pp., p.xe).

Wittgenstein claims throughout his later writings to be teaching a method, and this method, and this method is both philosophical and pedagogical (Savickey, 1998). So far as determining Wittgenstein’s method is concerned, I focus on what advice he gave to students and the perspective on his work that says he was practicing his method. Moore (1954; 1955), Bouwsma (1961), King, Lee (Wittgenstein, King, & Lee, 1980), Ambrose, Macdonald (Wittgenstein, Ambrose, & Macdonald, 1979) and evidently others recorded the advice to students. Those who see Wittgenstein practicing his method include Stern (1996), Cavell (1999) Hilmy (1987) and Savickey (1998) who chides us all for not paying enough attention to Wittgenstein’s plea that we read his works the right way, which is to see them as practice. Support for the perspective on practice also comes from a wide consideration of the man and his personal circumstances.

The significance of the method for philosophers, as an advance on earlier methods was summarised when Pears: “The old feelings and aspirations no longer discharge themselves in treatises which few can understand. They are somehow connected with familiar facts, which are presented in short, sharp observations, interspersed with arresting questions, and startling dialectical volte-faces” (Pears, 1971, p.112).

Philosophical method and philosophy

What is meant by a method in philosophy? My answer is practical. This paper seeks to define Wittgenstein’s advice to a student about to undertake a philosophical study. The assumptions are that Wittgenstein is employed to supervise an advanced student in philosophy and he advises the student to the best of his ability and consistent with the needs of the student and the needs of the university. (Ironically, he disliked formal education and its methods.) It may be seen that I have set up the situation in a constrained practical way and this is consistent with my view of ‘method’. What is being asked of Wittgenstein are his views as he might have given them shortly before his death and after he had time to reflect on all his work.

Accordingly, Wittgenstein cannot answer, “gain life experience”, “join the army”, “realise this will ruin your life”, “study chemistry”, “make philosophy your way of life”, or “find a better task”. Nor can he produce advice that is so general that it does not direct the unpromising student. He need not, however, be to concerned about inconsistencies between his early and latter statements. At some point, he must set out exactly what is to be done – something a student can follow. Is it possible to conclude with a list of instructions? Can we ever, in an intellectually honest way, persuade Wittgenstein to provide such a list?

Of course it is not just philosophy students who write philosophical essays. Students in politics, business, medicine and education also must determine the methods they will use in their investigations – consequently, the manual that sets out the method will have wide sales.

It might be thought that the practical view of method just begs the question. The student may have needs but it remains for the teachers and the discipline to demarcate what is to be acceptable as method. There are two aspects of this criticism to be considered. The first is the nature of the interplay between method and purpose; and the second is the nature of disciplines. These are questions for another day.

What is being asked in this paper is “what is a practical philosophical method”, “where do you get philosophical problems”, “how do you work on them”, “how do you know when you are successful”? The sections that address these questions are: Philosophy and life, Selecting topics, How to think, Success in philosophy. However, before addressing this list of topics, it is necessary to say something about the context in which Wittgenstein worked and the idiosyncrasies of our tutor.

A perspective on Wittgenstein

Many of the things that influenced Wittgenstein were so dramatic that they are easily understood today. In the last 50 years humankind has advanced its understanding of phenomena that impact on people. Wittgenstein grew up in a household that caused his three older brothers to commit suicide. Music was significant throughout his life. He was a war veteran who suffered the trauma produced by horrific and extended combat. He spent ten months as a prisoner of war. He had volunteered for the army, but intensely disliked his fellow solders, and eventually attended officer’s school. Photographs of Wittgenstein before and after the war illustrate its effect. Wittgenstein spoke about, and wrote about, committing suicide, mainly at the end and after the war. In the second war he worked mainly in Guys Hospital and with a psychological research unit in Newcastle. Before, after, and during, two wars he lived in communities brought together by the poignancy of national conflict. He lived in a rapidly changing world and thus an uncertain world. He was a covert homosexual and he feared his father until his father died. He never married. Wittgenstein was highly intelligent, and found difficulty relating to people. This appears to have manifested itself in his being a recluse at certain times, and in intensity in his personal communications (this intensity seems to have involved both his manner of speaking and the forms of words he used). His psychological problems, and his attitudes, appear to be exactly what you would expect given the facts about his life (Janik & Toulmin, 1973; Malcolm, Wright, & Wittgenstein, 2001; Monk, 1990; Schulte, 1992).

Many of Wittgenstein’s values related to academic work; he wanted to know, he was energetic, disciplined, and acutely aware of himself. He also used academic work, and probably music, to stabilise his own life. The desire to write, and to use writing as a medium of exploration, was born of mixed motives.

He was also driven by a desire to achieve. This manifested itself in Wittgenstein’s consistent remarks that he wanted to achieve in his various employments - to be a “decent” teacher, professor and contributor. He was more of a stoic than a cynic. The remark on his deathbed is telling, “Tell them that I had a wonderful life”. As Schulte says “Some remembering Wittgenstein’s severity, tortured intensity, and often acerbic criticism were amazed when they heard that. Perhaps they would have been less amazed had then given more thought to the man’s accomplishments” (Schulte, 1992, p.14).

Wittgenstein wanted to teach - he did not hide his methods or his thinking. He wanted to communicate and contribute to humankind (Malcolm et al., 2001). There were impediments to this that came from what he was thinking and his inability to satisfice (in other words, he had such high standards that he never could sign off on a document). He solved these problems by communicating with students/colleagues and having them distribute his ideas, and by arranging for people he trusted to bring his work into the public domain after his death (Moore, 1954; Moore, 1955). By all accounts his teaching was powerful, for example: “There is the extraordinary force of his personal teaching, which is something which cannot be wholly understood apart from his life and character… (Pears, 1971, p.112).

Wittgenstein’s work in philosophy has been seen as the practice of an ancient form of therapeutics that draws upon both philosophical and literary traditions. His questions, the questions that he most wanted to solve, we may broadly characterise as metaphysical. They are about the “meaning of life” and “ethics” (Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, p.p.147). The philosopher works upon himself or herself using techniques such confessions and mediation, ancient technologies of the self, and develops moral character, particularly, the moral character that relates to truthfulness. From this base can come statements of truth and the work on oneself continues until death. As in all metaphysical work, the motivation is to enable the human being to construct their escape from limitations both empirical and human, and the limitations are seen as more dark than light. The limitations for Wittgenstein include particularly the sphere of language, things that he has done to other people and the general futility of a world with horrific wars and suffering.

If this is what philosophy is about for Wittgenstein, is it sensible to seek his advice at all? Perhaps not unless the student has similar circumstances, but still we seek to learn from him and one can teach by example. But, if the example is a series of ‘spiritual exercises’ which are intimately related to the person of the philosopher, if the meanings of his arguments are located in his historical language games, and not in his mental state, and not in his moral character, is it then still going to be possible to learn from his example?

The “self writings” in a context that is very distant from us, and which emerges from circumstances, if indeed not needs, which we can never comprehend fully, are not obviously instructive. As has been noted, “… he provides no easy disciple relationship to those who seek to understand him or to follow his way of philosophising (Peters 2000, pp. 364-365).

There are several questions to ask:

Is not this focus on the self somewhat self-indulgent?
Are there not real problems that need attention and which are not related to individuals in the way that characterises Wittgenstein’s metaphysical issues?
If there are such real problems (perhaps ethical problems for the community-at-large), does the philosopher have anything to offer qua philosopher?

Understanding Wittgenstein’s method may be advanced if we review how it came to be established. It is said; Wittgenstein developed his method in his “middle period”, although there are significant (and consistent) references to the method in the Tractatus. In the middle period, he began to doubt his earlier work principally as published in the Tractatus. “Wittgenstein’s new method developed when he applied his early critique of language to itself”(Malcolm, 1986; Pears, 1971, pp., p.105). Pears sets out the inadequacies that Wittgenstein identified (Pears, 1971, pp.105-110) and then lists the points from this base that were significant when the alleged new method was developed:

It is empirical, meaning that it comes from a consideration of how language is actually used (which contrasts with the Tractatus to the extent that it assumed there was only one form of “language”, which in turn comes from Russell’s views)
It is not scientific, which means that it is primarily concerned with particular cases (applications of method, source of problems) that are not intricately bound to some particular theory. Accordingly, the application of the method is said to be more of an “art” (which appears to be a very weak use of “art”).
The “nuances of particular cases” are presented in careful descriptions of actual linguistic practices and collocations of examples (Pears, 1971, pp., pp.105-106).

How to find a problem

Distinctions must be drawn between the purpose of philosophy, the scope of philosophy, and the methods of philosophy. Unfortunately, the application of a method can be a “purpose” (and there are other similar examples), and so the clarity we seek is made more difficult to achieve.

Wittgenstein held to a narrow view regarding both the purpose and scope of philosophy although his views did appear to alter on this matter. In the early 1900’s he wrote “Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its basis” (Wittgenstein, 1961, Notebooks, 1914-1916, p.106).

It is possible that Wittgenstein’s narrow view of ‘philosophy’ has dampened enthusiasm for the use of his method in a wide range of places. It might be expected that his philosophical methods would relate to his philosophy.

But, we do not expect the method of carpentry to be of use only in carpentry. The method of carpentry is a set of skills, related to planning, the choice of timber and the use of particular tools. Learn these skills and they will have application beyond carpentry. So it is with Wittgenstein’s method: learn the skills and they will have application beyond the boundaries he sets for philosophy. Indeed, the boundary he sets for ‘philosophy’ is irrelevant to a skill based view of method.

It is also possible that the incorporation of Wittgenstein’s ideas into schools of thought tended to obscure his unique approach. The techniques of Moore, Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin established a ‘school’ of philosophy. It is legitimate to say Wittgenstein’s method has been incorporated into ‘analytic’, or more specifically ‘linguistic’, philosophy. The essence of analytic philosophy is method. But, that evolved intellectual tradition (as Toulmin, 1972, might say) does not help the student who wants to follow Wittgenstein’s methods, critique those methods and use them specifically to address issues of the moment.

The pivotal question about finding a problem is: are Wittgenstein’s ideas about deliberation (his method) restricted in their application to his narrow view of philosophy or are they an acceptable method for work in ethics (both the intellectual discipline of ethics and practice of ethics)? Under the heading “Ethics” below more is said about this, but first it is necessary to describe the method in a practical way.

Investigate in the right way

Here we consider what Wittgenstein said about method and thinking and what he did with his students. Published accounts leave us with a very clear picture of what was intended and what happened.

“I don’t try to make you believe something you don’t believe, but to make you do something you won’t do” (Wittgenstein MS 155, p. 83, quoted in Hilmy, 1987, p.5).

“I’m not teaching you anything; I’m trying to persuade you to do something” (Wittgenstein MS 155, p. 58, quoted in Hilmy, 1987, p.5).

“What I should like to get you to do is (not to agree with me in particular opinions but) to investigate the matter in the right way. To notice the interesting kind of things (i.e., the things which will serve as keys if you use them properly” (Wittgenstein MS 155, pp.72-73, quoted in Hilmy, 1987, pp., p. 5).

“He went on to say that, though philosophy had now been ‘reduced to a matter of skill’, yet this skill, like other skills, is very difficult to acquire. One difficult was that it required a ‘sort of thinking’ to which we are not accustomed and to which we have not been trained – a sort of thinking very different from what is required in the sciences. And he said that the required skill could not be acquired merely by hearing lectures: discussion was essential. As regards his own work, he said it did not matter whether his results were true or not: what mattered was that ‘a method had been found’” (Moore, 1955, pp., p.26).

“It is hardly correct to speak of these meetings as ‘lectures’, although this is what Wittgenstein called them. For one thing, he was carrying on original research in these meetings. He was thinking about certain problems in a way that he could have done had he been alone. For another thing, the meetings were largely conversation. Wittgenstein commonly directed questions to various persons present and reacted to their replies. Often the meetings consisted mainly of dialogue. Sometimes, however, when he was trying to draw a thought out of himself, he would prohibit, with a peremptory motion of the hand, any questions or remarks. There were frequent and prolonged periods of silence, with only an occasional mutter from Wittgenstein, and the stillest attention from the others. During these silences, Wittgenstein was extremely tense and active. His gaze was concentrated; his face was alive; his hands made arresting movements; his expression was stern” (Malcolm, Wright, & Wittgenstein, 1984, pp., p.25).

How to think

How to think? That topic occupied Wittgenstein a great deal - he wrote about it and has left us many examples of his thinking methods being applied.

The method of thinking as discerned by Wittgenstein, has been described as art which includes several skills "the art of attacking questions," "the art of disentangling," "the art of cure," "the art of finding one's way when lost," "the art of discussion," "the art of exposure," "the art of working puzzles," "the art of freeing us from illusions," "the art of the detective," and "the art of clarification, or relief from the toils of confusion." (Bouwsma, 1961, pp.147-149).

Wittgenstein was very conscious of the way that he thought, and this meant the relationship between thinking, writing and language. This led to the distinction between ‘what is said’ and ‘how it is said’. ‘How it is said’ is ‘style’ and Wittgenstein’s view was that you cannot really separate out what is said from how it is said. Hence, ‘what is said’ and ‘style’ are inextricably bound.

Wittgenstein says how he thinks:

“In fact, I think with the pen, since my head often knows nothing of what my hand writes.”

"In writing I often anticipate my thought.”

“Indeed, I draw a diagram not only in order to make my thoughts clear to others but also to understand the matter myself.”

This means that writing is used to generate ideas or to seek out relationships between ideas or words. When a student submits a paper to a tutor, they are using writing as a means of communication. This is distinct from using writing as a means of thinking.

There is nothing unusual in Wittgenstein’s way of thinking. There is a literature on process writing.

Use of questions

Like Socrates, Wittgenstein asks questions and examines the answers. He establishes a dialog. There are lists of questions that have been extracted from just a few selected pages (Pichler, 1992, "Words are deeds", paras. 1-3).

There are questions about the topic, but there are also questions about the method of proceeding (the next steps in the thinking). He asks: is this correct? How shall I now proceed? Why am I lost?

Questions about learning

When considering a particular concept, Wittgenstein will ask “How would one teach this?” He also often poses the more negative question “Who would learn anything from this?” There are also questions posed about how a child would first learn something (Macmillan, 1995). Proceeding in this way has been demonstrated in a proposal to develop lesson plans to teach doubting Thomas that what is probably a chair is a chair (McCarty & McCarty, 1995, pp.66-67).

Use of physical analogies

Consider “I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. The axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility” (Wittgenstein, Anscombe, & Wright, 1969, pp., #152)

Oral language

It is a part of Wittgenstein’s style to use colloquial language and to argue with an imaginary opponent. He argues with himself. His writing is very much like a record of a spoken discussion or debate.

The names “voice of temptation” (I feel tempted to say….) and “voice of correctness” (You cannot say that.) have been suggested as the two Wittgensteinian debating voices (Cavell, 1989, pp., p.38). The important point is that the voices seem to be at the same level of sophistication and power. It is not consistently (say) a master – pupil relationship (compare a Socratic dialogue); although the tone of the voices and the extent of the partnership invoked does appear to vary (for example, with regard to the abruptness of the correct voice, Pichler, 1992, "I don't know my way about", para. 2). Wittgenstein talks to himself on paper.

In German there are words that serve to remind the listener of points agreed earlier or which are so commonplace as to be agreed without discussion ("consensus constituting particles" see Pichler, 1992). Wittgenstein frequently uses such words.

Structure

Before he studied philosophy, Wittgenstein was trained as an engineer at the Technische Hochschule in Berlin and he subsequently worked as a graduate research engineer at the University of Manchester. He designed a variable volume combustion chamber and received a patent for a propeller design (Monk, 1990). It is likely that Wittgenstein remained very conscious of his early training (for an example of how he took ideas across disciplines, see Hamilton, 2001). Opinions vary on the extent to which Wittgenstein wanted to be an engineer and the extent to which his domineering father forced him into that field. Whatever is the truth of that, it is clear that he sought later to build his philosophical ideas into a logical structure. He had an engineers’ approach to philosophy. In the Tractatus he numbers each paragraph in a rigid structure in order to show the relationship between paragraphs. The structure of the whole and the relationship between ideas in the structure are remarkably transparent. Wittgenstein continued to number paragraphs in his later writing.

Sentences

Wittgenstein had a marked preference for the use of everyday language. This related both to the construction of sentences and their style, and to his choice of words.

Apart of sentence construction is his consideration of how a sentence will sound. This influences the length of the sentence, the grammatical form and the choice of words. Words that rhyme can save time.

The logic of a sentence is very important and Wittgenstein appreciates this: but, he sometimes breaks sentences apart – one sentence ends and he produces a parallel second sentence that revolves around the idea of the first sentence. This sentence construction has been likened to a construction that appears in music. As Michael Nedo says “These sets of sentences remind one of a partita where, in order to express something, one has to use different tunes” (as quoted in Pichler, 2002a).

Alternative words

Wittgenstein’s writing shows many examples of his search for the best/right/adequate/optimal/facilitating word. When he was uncertain about a word he underlined it with a wavy line. Pichler (1992) says that it often seems that Wittgenstein “writes alternatives for their own sake”. She refers particularly to words that do not make a profound difference in the sentence.

How do I find the right word? It is in any case as if I compared words with a gourmet’s palate … But I needn’t always explain why this or that word isn’t right. It is simply not right yet. So I keep on searching and am not satisfied. Finally I come to rest, I’m satisfied. This (and nothing else) is the nature of the search and the finding.

This suggests that when making the choice between alternative words there are no explicit criteria of which Wittgenstein was conscious. A gourmet may enjoy the food without dwelling on why some dishes are better than other. But, this does not mean that the gourmet cannot give reasons for preferring one taste to another at a particular time.

This care with words has several aspects to it:

1 When you dwell on a word you slow down the writing process and thus allow time in which ideas may emerge.

2 Alternative words produced are a part of a “trail and error” exercise. One or several may be accepted.

3 Not every idea has a word associated with it in every language.

4 The selection of a particular word has two aspects. On the one hand we must select the word that helps bring into being the meaning we like. On the other hand, the word helps to create the style by relating to other words in a particular way.

5 The provision of alternatives allows the writer to broaden out concepts. It brings into being, in effect, a new word that is an amalgam or composite of the ideas in particular words.

6 The depth of Wittgenstein’s searching is indicated by his work with alternative words. Pichler (1992) records that there are 2,700 alternatives in just 75 pages.

7 Everyday words are to be preferred.

Economy

We are consistently urged to economy in writing. “In logic, what is unnecessary is of no help. What isn’t necessary is superfluous.”

The first paragraph of Philosophical Investigations has one sentence with four words. In his manuscript it may be seen that he tried out various formulations of the idea over three pages. Economy, rhythm and sound seem to have all been important elements in Wittgenstein’s sentences.

Ethics as content

Perhaps for a time Wittgenstein believed philosophy, and thus the work of philosophers, should be confined to a very narrow range of problems. Certainly, he believed that philosophy should have application in the practical world.

Whilst ultimate moral principles cannot be identified, any more than we can identify ultimate epistemological principles, we are not excused from confronting practical ethical problems. In the domain of ethics, convincing someone is not a matter of giving them reasons, but it becomes persuasion. “This … means that we are able to justify (technically by reference to ‘language games’) why we act in a certain way, but are not at the same time able to give an ultimate, exhaustive justification” (Smeyers & Marshall, 1995, p.12).

Success in Philosophy

Intellectual traditions require that students review the literature and build their work at the cutting edge of humankind’s understanding. The traditions as placed in institutions are generally called disciples and one concept of education is based on the notion that students must be “initiated” into the discipline (R S Peters).

Wittgenstein attitude to antecedence stands in contrast to this: "... I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. Indeed, what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else..." (Wittgenstein, 1922, p.3).

What should the student show to the tutor? Should it be just the finished product, or should it be evidence that the method has been doggedly applied – outcome or process? Wittgenstein left us his notebooks, which are workbooks, and show process. He made two consistent and full attempts to produce a finished product: the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations. He completed the Tractatus and then came to see it as flawed although he did say that it was a good starting point for the reading of the second book (Wittgenstein, 1922). The second book he never published and published posthumously what he proposed turned out to be 693 numbered paragraphs (Wittgenstein, 1953, Part I). He tried, indeed desperately tried, to produce a finished book but gave up.

Why did Wittgenstein work on particular problems such as those that came from Russell’s epistemological ideas? The problems in the literature provided an example of a puzzle, or problem in philosophy, on which Wittgenstein could test out his method. Over a period of more than 20 years, Wittgenstein did this. The results were on scraps of paper, marginal notes, long tracts that he said did nothing much. There are no finished products, he said. The model is “practice problem – skill – trial solution – lessons learnt about method”.

The drainage system of a city is an integrated system with purpose, logic, design, pumps, pipes, connections and structures. Wittgenstein is not trying to build a system like this. Wittgenstein is experimenting with ways of digging holes in the ground. The relationship between the digging of holes and the drainage system is the relationship between Wittgenstein’s work and any systematic philosophy.

In his mind, Wittgenstein must have been building systems. A system is just a complex of related concepts, facts, and so on, all with an overall purpose. It does not have to be particularly extensive (book length, shall we say). This bursts through, but because of his recording system, and because of contextual considerations, we have debate about what the system was about (the classic recent example being whether he was working on ethics or logical atomism).

Wittgenstein is explicit: he is trying to teach himself a skill. When he taught philosophy (and perhaps even small children) he tried to teach this skill. To learn a skill you need to practice it. Wittgenstein practiced on everything he could find. He practiced with enormous energy and determination. When things were not working he worked on anyway and then wrote a note saying what he had produced was hopeless. He said explicitly that every practice run might one day provide an idea or technique that would be of use elsewhere.

Consequently, we see fragments and it is foolish to try to use them unless you do so in the way that Wittgenstein proscribed. We see holes dug everywhere and forget that it is the technique of digging that was being investigated. We forget the holes do not relate to the drainage system. Of course, it is hard to learn much about the techniques of digging by looking at holes that have been dug, although you can learn something, and it is likewise with Wittgenstein’s techniques of philosophy.

Peters and Marshall bring it all together, but they do not make enough of the analysis of what-was-written-when. That is, they help move us from the traditional view that we are trying to understand the work of an English philosopher of language, to the view that we are trying to understand a Viennese ethicist with a profound education in European thought. From this new perspective they identify some areas we can address with new eyes.

What Peters and Marshall do not say is how we are to read the words / paragraphs that Wittgenstein wrote. Hilmy did this – he tracks the paragraphs and explains why they were written, how they relate, and what Wittgenstein was trying to do, day-by-day. Hilmy got a bad press. Two reviews of his book focus on his deficiencies as a writer but acknowledge his research scholarship. Peters and Marshall do not mention him. However, as far as I know, only Hilmy has set out the detailed analysis of Wittgenstein’s diaries, which are the workbooks.

Authenticity

Repeatedly, Wittgenstein urged students to do their own thinking and to use his work to assist where it could be so used. For example:

Those who seek to identify a systematic Wittgensteinian philosophy will be disappointed. Published works are his thinking and nothing is completed. There are good examples of scholars proceeding in just this way. An example is the work on pedagogy by L and D McCarty (1995). Wittgenstein stimulates interest in a topic. Independent work is done using methods that are distinctly Wittgensteinian. The result is then compared to Wittgenstein.

The McCarty approach contrasts with Cuypers. He asks a question and then “… I think, that a distinctively Wittgensteinian answer can be suggested. To be sure, no straightforward answer of Wittgenstein, or even broadly Wittgensteinian answer, is readily available. My construction of a Wittgensteinian outlook on …” (Cuypers, 1995, p.132). To what extent is this going to be an attempt to work out Wittgenstein’s position and to what extent is the author proceeding with authenticity? It is a marginal case. Of course we must not say Cuypers is wrong in his approach to his topic - it is just that it is not what Wittgenstein suggests.

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