Opportunities to decentralise power: New Zealand's neo-liberal revolution in public administration and the governance of schools
Robert Shaw
School
of Management
The Open Polytechnic of New Zealand
ABSTRACT
New Zealand’s neoliberal revolution in public administration is incomplete. Government in 1989 devolved power and decentralised decision-making. The challenge for schools now is to respond to their new autonomy and to do this they must (a) establish governance mechanisms that work (b) test the limits of schools’ powers.
Legislation altered structures and administrative mechanisms in the education sector but it did not alter the values of the key decision-makers who operate at the local level. Parents who have control of school boards, supported by teachers, could now embark on their own reforms.
This paper advocates a mechanism of governance based on three cyclical processes. Once successfully governed, some schools with credibility will pursue goals that are beyond those expected by government and the classic power struggle between local and central decision-makers will emerge with new energy as parents assert their rights.
KEY WORDS: devolution, economic rationalism, governance
INTRODUCTION
The ‘New Zealand experiment’, the rise of the neoliberal state, is described as a consequence of globalisation (Boston, 1996) as are the education reforms specifically (Locke, 1999; Robertson, 1999). Officials imported ideas into New Zealand and assisted them into legislation.
State Sector Reforms
Successive governments through the late 1980s and 1990s reformed the systems and structures of government administration, with a focus on the allocation of functions and financial management. Economic pressures, particularly public indebtedness, political opportunism, and a determined cadre of dedicated public servants worked together to bring about extensive restructuring (Boston, 1996).
Theories that contributed to the outcome, included public choice theory, agency theory and transaction-cost economics, but ideas drawn from the new public management movement were probably the most influential. The theoretical and practical factors that drove the reforms are documented by Boston who says they were “a carefully crafted, integrated, and mutually reinforcing reform agenda” (Boston, 1996). Economic theory as a source for explaining all forms of human behaviour was elevated to the status of a science and became the “master discourse” (Fitzsimons, Peters & Roberts, 1999).
Education Reforms
Government applied the same principles in the education reforms that they applied to other sectors such as health, science, welfare, and local government. The reform process was “top-down”, and efficient - the initial proposals did not alter much as the result of 700 public submissions (McKenzie, 1999). It was said the reforms were about “administration and not teachers”, and they generated mild resentment particularly among teachers (Rutherford, 1994). However, teachers continue to take an active political interest in all aspects of education (Jesson, 1999). Research in seven schools suggests there is “enthusiasm, scepticism but mostly ambivalence” and possibly also a “general takeup of the reforms” by parents, board members and teachers (Harold et al, 1999). Official publications describe and justify the reforms (Ministry of Education, 1995; Butterworth & Butterworth, 2001)
Of course, the values of those who worked in schools did not change, because the reforms were rapid and centrally imposed. It is a thesis in the present paper that these values will soon assert themselves in the new framework. The values are cooperation, professionalism, moral character traits, dedication to students’ needs, and “localism” (MacPherson, 1999).
Boards of Trustees
The committee that reviewed educational administration reported: “Consumers need to be able to directly influence their learning institution by having a say in the running of it or by being able to turn to acceptable alternatives. Only if people are free to choose, can a true co-operative partnership develop between the community and the learning institutions (Department of Education, 1988, page 4). They concluded that boards, with a majority of their members being parents, should effectively control schools.
The Education Act 1989 established boards of trustees to govern primary and secondary schools. The parents of the children at a school elect most of the board members (the author of this paper is an elected board member).
Boards became responsible for the management of the school, have the ability to hire staff, and must account to both their electorates and government agencies for educational and financial outcomes. The proposal was to allocate one annual grant to schools for them to use as they saw fit, however, controversy over funding developed as teacher unions sought to maintain established nationwide conditions (McKenzie, 1999).
The Consequences of the Education Reforms
There has been comment on the reforms and Codd provides a reasoned summary. He concludes the reforms “have promoted a narrow, reductionist model of accountability informed by theories of managerialism and economic rationalism and based upon a culture of mistrust” (Codd, 1999, page 45). He notes as “further consequences” the promotion of competition between educational institutions, the reduced participation of teachers and professional educators in the policy making process, and the implementation of performance management and appraisal systems (ibid, page 49).
It is the management / governance interface (human problems and the definition of the governance role) that appears to be the major practical concern for schools (O’Sullivan, 1998) and little in the self-governance model (as currently extant) evidently improves educational outcomes (Cassie, 2000). This appears consistent with international research (Rentoul, 1999; Rentoul & Rosanowski 2000).
Legitimacy
It is argued, “Neoliberalism, as has been applied in the New Zealand context, is a substantive discourse of governance which is potent precisely because of its capacity to combine economics, the social and politics on behalf of rational choice as a principle of legitimacy” (Fitzsimons, Peters & Roberts, 1999, p 38). The legitimacy of academic theory has dominated the reforms to date, which is consistent with their centralist nature. But, the legitimacy of personal relationships and responsibility will come to the fore if boards of trustees assert themselves. The fundamental tension between central and local administration is always in the main a tension of legitimacy. In education, it is “our children”, but the “taxpayer’s money”. The reestablishment of legitimacy as the result of the state sector reforms is an issue in many sectors (Shaw, 1994).
The conflicting demands of autonomy and public accountability are a central issue for the universities (Blakeman & Boston, 1999; Gould, 1999) but this issue has yet to become the focus of comment for the school sector (the key issues are summarised by Alvey & Buurman, 2000).
Farrell concludes that the while governing bodies provide the opportunity for citizen participation, citizens are not actively involved in school governance (Farrell, 2000). She says after a study of British schools “governing bodies are not involved at a high level in decisions about what goes on within schools, refuting both the participatory democracy and new managerialist perspectives”. It appears that the approach to governance taken in the schools she studied is not that being pursued in the present paper.
WHY BOARDS FAIL
Most boards fail to govern properly. This means that they do not competently operate the mechanisms advocated below, and that there is significant concern being expressed about governance. It does not mean that the schools are in chaos or that the quality of education provided is inadequate.
Boards fail to govern properly for two main reasons: the Ministry of Education has not set out adequately what governance entails, and a wide range of tasks distracts boards.
Perceptions
Trustees all agree that boards should have short meetings, focus on the top-level goals, and let the principal run the school, however, meetings drift, and minor issues find their way to the table (personal observations; Barneveld, 2001). Objective assessments conclude that the quality of board membership is adequate (Thrupp, 1988; Mayston, 1998).
The School Trustees Association National Training Coordinator has summarised the situation:: “My experience tells me that for many boards: the question of the definition of governance/management is never explored; no big picture of how vision and strategic planning goals are achieved and reviewed is ever discussed; no collective definition is worked through regarding the boundary between the work of the principal and the work of the board; delegations are not discusses” (Hines, 2001). Board members are unclear about their relationship to the principal and the extent to which they should represent parents (Barneveld, 2001).
Initial Lack of Focus on Governance
When the Ministry of Education set out school policies in the reforms, they used a functional classification. They identified the areas of activity or decision-making within schools and used these as these as headings. The policy manuals of most schools still use this framework and often the committees of boards have the same titles.
Accordingly, we often find policies and committees for: Finance, Property, Personnel, Curriculum, and Community. The list relates to what the management does. It does not focus on what the board of trustees does (it does not relate to the governance function).
The Ministry’s functional list probably did not include governance for several reasons. In the new Ministry when the policy was written, it was not well understood that governance was a different, complex function for schools (the author of the present article was there at the time). The people who established the policy structures came largely from schools and not from organisations that used the governance / management framework. Some thought that governance, some how or other, relates to all the other functions and so it is already present, or it is overarching, and thus its processes do not need to be specified. Governance was not at that time an integral part of the functioning of institutions such as city councils. In the local government reforms legislation prescribed in detail how governance was to be achieved (Local Government Act 1989, Local Government Amendment Act Number 3, 1999).
Inadequate Guidance
Perhaps we can understand boards lack of focus governance processes today if we consider the information provided to trustees by the Ministry of Education (Ministry of Education, 2001). In their key document the Ministry does not set out the necessary mechanisms (processes) of governance. Instead, they begin with a summary of the central agencies, list the boards’ legal obligations, provide information on curriculum, and conclude with a chapter entitled “Boards Manage Resources To Ensure the Best Possible Learning”. This last chapter is about staffing, payroll management, teacher recruitment, property and school transport. There is a section entitled “Performance Management” which is about the performance management of staff and says inter alia that the board should work through an annual process of objective setting for the principal and monitor the principal’s performance at least annually. This is the only governance process described.
Recent statements by the Minister of Education reinforce the task-based model of governance. “The key task for trustees is therefore to find ways to support effective teaching in the classroom by building the professional capability of teachers and creating an environment that encourages and supports excellent teaching (Mallard, 2001).
Many Tasks
It is hard to focus on ill-defined governance processes when boards confront such a wide range of tasks (Barrington, 1992; Kilmister, 1999; Norrie, 1999; O’Sullivan, 1998). For example boards manage student behaviour and thus decide if a student is to be expelled from school for “continual disobedience” (Education Act, 1989). In 1997, boards suspended 1,834 students for incidents involving “drugs other than alcohol or tobacco” (Abel & Casswell, 1989). Boards manage lawyers who want to visit children, negotiate deals with power companies, and negotiate with local authorities on property taxes (New Zealand School Trustees Association, 2001).
HOW TO GOVERN A SCHOOL
The present paper advocates a form of governance that is based on orthodox management theory (Bartol & Martin, 1998; Inkson & Kolb, 1998) and that operates in many New Zealand educational institutions (for example, The Open Polytechnic of New Zealand, 1999), and all local authorities (Local Government Act 1989).
Governance is Process
Accordingly, governance involves the operation of three separate, but related, cyclic processes. Each process is necessary if elected school boards are to determine the goals for their school and control the schools managers and teachers. The processes are:
1 The strategic plan cycle
2 The annual plan cycle (includes the budget cycle).
3 The principal’s performance management cycle
These are control cycles that all have the same features – managers/governors set goals or objectives or targets or budgets, they then measure achievement, and finally they adjust the targets for next year (Bartol & Martin, 1998; Inkson & Kolb, 1998). The value of the process lies in its specificity, the thinking the board must do, and the need to involve staff, parents and the community
In addition to the plans and reports of three cycles, two other documents are important for effective governance: the board’s contract with the principal, and, a delegations register which sets out the accountability procedures for the use of each delegation.
Plans
The strategic plan sets out the long-term goals for the school and its philosophy of education. These things are justified with reference to the social, economic, political and educational environments in which the school operates, and should include an account of how teachers, parents and the wider community were consulted. The more quantified the document the more useful it will be and it should incorporate a landscape strategy, property maintenance and development plan, and long-term financial goals.
Charters that set out strategic goals for each school were to have been agreed annually between each board and the Minister of Education and thus would be a dynamic blend of central and local requirements. Dynamic charters (essentially the heart of a strategic plan) give schools significant power.
Annual plans must be directly derived from the strategic plan to ensure the board takes a sufficiently long-term view of the school. The annual plan must specify specific, measurable results expected. The budget does this so far as money is concerned, but there are educational, social, curriculum, personnel, and community objectives to consider.
A board’s ability to write performance indicators will improve with practice, as has been the experience of city councils that must use the same planning mechanisms (the author of the present paper has been an elected member of a council for 10 years).
Principal’s Performance Cycle
The principal must be charged with achieving the strategic and annual plans. But, the board needs a mechanism to more finely tune the principal. The most important part of the job when managing the principal is not the making of judgements about performance or achievement. It is how boards use performance indicators each year to direct their principal towards key immediate objectives.
CONCLUSION
The New Zealand legislation that establishes and controls schools has built into it the concepts associated with the neoliberal reforms of the state sector. The central branches of the executive have implemented the changes and applied the new principles. However, schools, the local level of government in education, have yet to fully embrace these principles. They could do this by applying orthodox management techniques to the governance function.
There are three likely outcomes if boards of trustees discipline themselves sufficiently and operate the governance cycles as described above.
First, the quality of school management and thus the educational experiences for children will improve. This is because there will be a stronger focus on collectively achieving agreed objectives, and resources will be more effectively used.
Second, some schools will want to pursue goals beyond those expected. The government of the day, the Ministry of Education, the Auditor General and Treasury will be challenged as schools pursue more diverse objectives, become more responsive to their communities and more integrated with their communities. The conflicting demands of autonomy and public accountability will become an issue for schools as much as it is now for the universities, and claims of personal and theoretical legitimacy will abound.
Third, decision-makers will become more confident and more innovative. Codd’s concerns will be addressed at the local level. For example, primary and secondary schools in a geographic area (Porirua City) are working to harmonise their strategic plans and thus address issues of competition. Boards can involve teachers in the writing of plans and thus professional people can be brought into both policy making and the operation of appraisal systems.
The management perspective in this paper leads to the conclusion that after 10 years it is far too early to assess the effects of the education reforms.
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